We propose a new statistic to improve the pooled version of the triangle test used to combat the fingerprint-copy counter-forensic attack against PRNU-based camera identification [1] . As opposed to the original version of the test, the new statistic exploits the one-tail nature of the test, weighting differently positive and negative deviations from the expected value of the correlation between the image under analysis and the candidate images, i.e., those image suspected to have been used during the attack. The experimental results confirm the superior performance of the new test, especially when the conditions of the test are challenging ones, that is when the number of images used for the fingerprint-copy attack is large and the size of the image under test is small.
Photo-Response Non Uniformity (PRNU) noise [2] has been successfully used for forensic camera identification [3] and image forgery detection [4] , [5] . Techniques based on PRNU are prone to the so-called fingerprint-copy (or PRNU-copy) attack [6] , according to which, a forger, usually referred to as Eve, estimates the PRNU from a set of publicly available images acquired by the camera of a victim, say Alice, and implant the estimated PRNU into an image shot by a different camera. An effective countermeasure against the fingerprint-copy attack is the triangle test proposed in [1] . The test exploits the fact that an image forged with the fingerprint-copy attack shares with the images used by Eve to estimate the PRNU other noise components in addition to the PRNU, hence resulting in an unnaturally high correlation between the forged image and the images used to create the forgery. In its simplest version, the triangle test allows Alice to understand which images, in a set of publicly available images acquired by her camera, have been used to produce the forgery. In other cases, Alice's goal is just to prove that the image under analysis has been forged by means of a fingerprint-copy attack, without the need to identify the exact subset of images used to produce the forgery. To do so, Alice can resort to the pooled version of the test [1] . The pooled test is generally very powerful and the effectiveness of the counter-forensic methods proposed so far against the single-image triangle test, e.g. [7] , [8] , [9] , is dramatically reduced when the pooled triangle test is considered.
In this paper, we propose a refined statistic for the pooled triangle test, that allows to improve the performance of the test with particular reference to those situations where the test is less reliable, namely when the number of images Eve has access to is large and when the size of the analysed image is small. The improved statistic relies on the observation that the original pooled test treats in the same way both images exhibiting an unnaturally high correlation with the image under test and those for which this correlation is lower than expected. In this way, the analysis somewhat neglects the one-tail nature of the test 1 according to which the images used for the PRNU-copy attack are expected to exhibit a larger correlation with respect to those that have not been used to create the forgery.
The new statistic, on the contrary, accumulates the deviations from the expected correlation by considering their sign. The resulting test, then, decides that the image under analysis has been subject to a PRNU-copy attack only in the presence of positive deviations. The superior performance of the proposed statistic are assessed in a wide variety of cases, by varying the parameters that impact most on the performance of the test, that is, the number N of images used by Eve to estimate the PRNU, the overall number N c of public images available, and the size of the images.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the PRNU-copy attack and the pooled triangle test.
The proposed improved statistic is described in Section III. The results of the experimental validation are presented and thoroughly discussed in Section IV. Eventually, we draw our conclusions and present some directions for future work in Section V.
II. PRNU-COPY ATTACK AND POOLED TRIANGLE TEST
Let us denote with C 1,pub a public dataset of N c images acquired by Alice's camera C 1 . Eve's goal is to take an image J coming from another camera C 2 and modify it in such a way that it looks like as if it was generated by C 1 . To do so, Eve estimates the PRNU of C 1 from a subset of N images, I i , i = 1, .., N , belonging to C 1,pub , as
whereK E is the PRNU estimate obtained by Eve,
is the noise residual of I i , and F is a denoising filter, e.g. the one in [10] . The noise residual has the form W Ii = I i K + θ, where K is the true PRNU of C 1 and θ collects the non-PRNU noise components of the residual [2] . Then, Eve superimposes the estimated PRNU onto J, obtaining the forged image
where [·] indicates rounding to integers and α is the fingerprint strength. The value of α must be sufficiently large to pass the threshold-based correlation test (see below), but, at the same time, as small as possible to make the forgery undetectable.
On the analyst side, camera attribution is carried out by relying on a threshold-based correlation test, that is by computing ρ = corr(W I , IK A ), where I is the image under test, andK A is Alice's estimation of the PRNU fingerprint of C 1 , which can be reliably obtained from a limited number of flat-field images. Image I is attributed to C 1 , if ρ is above a threshold, set by fixing the false alarm probability. The forged image J can easily pass the correlation test [6] , thus being wrongly attributed to C 1 .
As a countermeasure, Alice can apply the triangle test [1] to the images attributed to C 1 , to determine if they are genuine images shot by C 1 , or they are the result of a PRNU-copy attack. The idea behind the triangle test is the following: each image I i used by Eve to estimate K, shares with the forged image J not only the PRNU term (as it happens for a genuine -non forged -image), but also the other terms of the noise residual W Ii ; then, the correlation of the residual of J with the one of I i , namely c Ii,J = corr(W Ii , W J ), is typically larger when J is a forgery and image I i has been used to estimate the fingerprint implanted in J .
By following [1] , given a non-forged image J and an image I from C 1 , it is possible to compute the expected value of c I,J , namedĉ I,J . The dependence between the real value of c I,J andĉ I,J when I has not been used by
Eve to forge J, is well fit by a straight line, hereafter referred to as inference line, c I,J = λĉ I,J + η, for some slope λ and intercept η. On the contrary, if I has been used by Eve to forge J , the correlation c I,J takes much For notational simplicity, in the following, given a test image J and a candidate image I i , we let d J,i = c Ii,J − λĉ Ii,J − η. In [1] it is shown that the distribution of d J,i is approximately constant with I i (andĉ Ii,J ), so we can write:
for some f J , independent of I i andĉ I,J . Let, µ J and σ J denote the mean and variance of d J,i when I i is not used by Eve to create the forgery J 2 (expectedly, µ J is very close to 0). In [1] , it is argued that f J is often close to a Gaussian distribution, that is f J ∼ N (µ J , σ J ), even if for some images a Student's t-distribution may be a more conservative choice. For sake of brevity, in the following, we stick to the Gaussian model, the difference with respect to the Student's t-model being very small based on our experiments.
A. The pooled triangle test
Let J be the to-be-tested image and let H 0 be the hypothesis that J has not been forged, or, equivalently in our scenario, that no image in C 1,pub has been used by Eve to forge J. Let H 1 be the opposite hypothesis that some of the images in C 1,pub have been used to forge J. Let k be the number of candidate images considered by Alice to carry out the test (we have k = N c when the entire public set is used for the test). We denote with C k 1,pub the corresponding subset. The pooled triangle test described in [1] uses the following statistic to decide if some of the images in C k 1,pub have been used to forge J:
When f J is a Gaussian, testing L J k is very similar in spirit to base the test on the sum of the squared distances. In fact, in such a case, we have
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We run our tests by considering the Nikon D7000 camera (C 1 ) and the Nikon D90 camera (C 2 ) in the RAISE dataset [12] . We split the images from C 1 as follows: a total number of 1000 images were used to build the public set C 1,pub (in some experiments only a subset of 600 images was used as C 1,pub ); 300 images were used to build the private set C
1,priv , used by Alice to estimate the parameters of the triangle test, that is, to estimate λ and η and build the inference line; another set C (2) 1,priv of 300 images was used to establish the decision threshold of the correlation detector (with a true positive rate set to 0.9). Other 300 images, passing the correlation test, formed a third set C (3) 1,priv used in the experiments to simulate H 0 . Eventually, all the 100 flat-field images available in the RAISE dataset for the camera C 1 were used to estimate the PRNU. A number of 300 images coming from a camera Nikon D90 were used to build Eve's set C 2 . The original sizes of the images from Eve's and Alice's cameras C 1 and C 2 are different. In our experiments, we considered image sizes of 1936 × 1296 (medium size) and 1024 × 1024 (small size) pixels, obtained by cropping the central parts of the images from C 1 and C 2 . With regard to the fingerprint-copy attack performed by Eve, for simplicity, we considered the minimum strength α resulting in a positive identification in the correlation test. This is a worst case assumption for Alice, since in practice Eve can not reproduce exactly Alice's test, and then she will apply an α which is larger than such a minimum value to be sure to pass the test.
We run our experiments by considering two slightly different versions of the pooled test, corresponding to two different interpretations of the error probability and, in particular, the false alarm probability. The two resulting settings correspond to the following testing conditions: a) Given a test image J, the error probabilities are computed by varying the subset of k images used to compute 
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a new statistic for the pooled triangle test originally introduced in [1] . The improved statistic is based on the observation that the statistic proposed in [1] somewhat neglects the one-tailed nature of the test.
Experiments show that the proposed statistic achieves better results, especially in the most challenging case when the number of images N used by Eve for the fingerprint-copy attack is large (and comparable to N c ). Further tests could be carried out to investigate the limit values of N (and N c ) for which the test based on the new statistic is still reliable. As a further work, we plan to evaluate the performance of the pooled test based on the improved statistic in the presence of targeted attacks like those introduced in [7] , [9] . 
